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I’M THROWING ON MY LOUBOUTIN’S: HIGH FASHION POST-SALE
CONFUSION
Jennifer Whritenour
Seton Hall University School of Law
ABSTRACT
The purpose of trademark law is to provide the owner of the trademark with the enforceable
right to exclude others from using that mark. This guarantee of protection secures the public’s
interest in protection against deceit as to the sources of its purchases, as well as the
businessman’s right to enjoy business earned through good will and reputation attached to the
trademark. To receive trademark protection, a mark must be inherently distinctive and source
indicating, as it serves to identify a particular source. This paper will explore the use of
trademark protection in regards to color in high fashion, with a pair of red soled shoes created
by French fashion designer Christian Louboutin.
In September 2012, the United States Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit heard the
case of Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent and held that Louboutin’s design features
acquired secondary meaning. But, the court also held that Yves Saint Laurent’s use of the design
with respect to its monochromatic use of the color red on its high heels was not infringement, as
the secondary meaning only applied to shoes with a red sole that had a contrasting color. This
paper addresses the issue in the Louboutin case and applies the Second Circuit’s test for
likelihood of confusion to argue that while there may be a lack of point-of-sale confusion, there
is likely post-sale confusion among non-purchasers.
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INTRODUCTION
Christian Louboutin is a prominent French fashion designer who sells more than six hundred
thousand shoes a year. Louboutin took a part of the shoe that is most commonly ignored, the
sole of the shoe, and began to design shoes with a red lacquered sole. When asked why he chose
the color red, Louboutin gave the following as his reasoning: “I selected the color because it is
engaging, flirtatious, memorable, and the color of passion.”1 In March 2011, the New Yorker
described Louboutin’s shoes as such: “The sole of each of his shoes is lacquered in a vivid,
glossy red. The red sole offers the pleasure of secret knowledge to their wearer, and that of
serendipity to their beholder. Like Louis XIV’s red heels, they signal a sort of sumptuary code,
promising a world of glamour and privilege. They are also a marketing gimmick that renders an
otherwise indistinguishable product recognizable.”2 This description by the New Yorker
illustrates that this is not just any ordinary shoe, but a shoe that has achieved worldwide fame.
On March 27, 2007, Louboutin filed an application with the Patent and Trademark office to
protect his infamous shoes. In January 2008, the Patent and Trademark Office granted trademark
protection for the Red Sole Mark. The trademark stated: “The color(s) red is/are claimed as a
feature of the mark. The mark consists of a lacquered red sole on footwear.”3 It should be noted
that since the trademark was granted in 2008, it had not been in use for five consecutive years
prior to the time the litigation began in 2011. There is a special protection that allows a registered
trademark that has been in continuous use for five years to be deemed as incontestable in certain
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Lauren Collins, Sole Mate: Christian Louboutin and the Psychology of Shoes, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 28,
2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/28/110328fa_fact_collins?currentPage=all
2
Collins, supra note 1.
3
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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circumstances.4 But, because the registered mark here had not reached this time frame, this
special exception does not apply.
Louboutin’s are worn by countless celebrities and its prominence in the media has resulted in
numerous knockoffs. In 2010, Louboutin started a website to help buyers purchase authentic
Louboutin’s by listing authorized retailers.5 But, while this website serves to deter people from
purchasing fake shoes, there have been other issues with Louboutin’s designs. In January 2011,
Louboutin’s fashion house learned that fashion house Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) was marketing
and selling a monochromatic red shoe that included a red sole as part of YSL’s 2011 Cruise
fashion line.6 In an attempt to avoid litigation, Louboutin requested that YSL cease selling the
allegedly infringing shoes. But, negotiations between the parties failed.7
This paper explores the litigation surrounding the red soled shoes and suggests that the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not go far enough in its decision. The biggest flaw in the
decision is the lack of analysis regarding a likelihood of confusion. The absence of this analysis
in the context of post-sale confusion leaves open the floodgates for more potential litigation as
well as uncertainty. This paper uses the Polaroid factors to determine whether or not a likelihood
of confusion exists and suggests a different holding than the one given by the Second Circuit.
Part I of this paper discusses the district court’s decision which led to an appeal to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals by Christian Louboutin. Part II discusses the decision rendered by the
Second Circuit in 2012. Part III provides a background on basic trademark law and the evolution
of granting trademark protection to color. Part IV discusses point-of-sale confusion and how that
does not apply to this case. Part V addresses post-sale confusion and provides analysis regarding

4

See 15 U.S.C. §1065; see Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc., 679 F.3d at 417-18.
Stop Fake: Christian Louboutin, http://stopfake.christianlouboutin.com/ (Last accessed October 28, 2013).
6
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2011), at 449.
7
Id., at 213.
5
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a likelihood of confusion by way of the Second Circuit’s test for confusion with the Polaroid
factors. Part VI mentions recent litigation regarding Louboutin and Part VII concludes the paper.
PART I: The District Court Case: “Louboutin I”
In 2011, the Southern District of New York heard the case of Christian Louboutin S.A. v.
Yves Saint Laurent in which Louboutin sought a preliminary injunction to stop YSL from
marketing shoes that use this confusingly similar red sole trademark.8 The Southern District held
that Louboutin’s registered trademark for use of lacquered red color on outsoles did not merit
protection under the Lanham Act.9 The court held that color can only be granted trademark
protection if it “acts as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source,
without serving any other significant function.”10 The court reasoned that “[A]warding one
participant in the designer shoe market a monopoly on the color red would impermissibly hinder
competition among other participants.”11 Furthermore, the court found Louboutin to be unlikely
to “prove that its red outsole brand is entitled to trademark protection, even if it has gained
enough public recognition to have acquired secondary meaning.”12 According to the District
Court, color as a trademark in the fashion industry has been held to be a valid mark in cases
where the color is not merely source indicating, but in a distinct combination or pattern that
manifests a conscious effort to design a uniquely identifiable mark embedded in the goods.13 The
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Id., at 449.
Id., at 228.
10
Id., at 214(quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995) (“Green-gold color of manufacturer's dry
cleaning press pads could be registered as trademark; color had developed secondary meaning, since customers
identified color as manufacturer's, and color served no other function.))
11
Id., at 454.
12
Id., at 449.
13
See Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, Inc., No. 8 Civ. 5781, 2009 WL 1675080, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009).
(holding registered Burberry check pattern entitled to statutory presumption of validity). Louis Vuitton Malletier,
454 F.3d at 116 (observing the “LV” monogram combined in a pattern of rows with thirty-three bright color)
(reviewing these cases shows that the court points out that the valid trademark was a combination of an arrangement
of colors and “… their synergy to create a distinct recognizable image purposely intended to identify a source while
at the same time serving as an expressive, ornamental, or decorative concept.” See “Louboutin I” at 451.)
9
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district court ruled that Louboutin’s trademark was not valid and therefore was not entitled to
protection. As a result, the court stated that a preliminary injunction was not warranted here.14
Following this result, Louboutin appealed this case to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
PART II: Court of Appeals Case, “Louboutin II”
In 2012, the Court of Appeals dealt with the following issue: whether a single color may
serve as a legally protected trademark in the fashion industry, and in particular, as the mark for a
particular style of high fashion women’s footwear.15 Louboutin argues that the District Court
erred in the following ways:
1. holding that the Red Sole Mark was not entitled to protection;
2. applying the doctrine of aesthetic functionality to hold that a single color on a fashion
item could not act as a trademark;
3. failing to give weight to the statutory presumption of validity deriving from the Red Sole
Mark’s registration;
4. applying an improper analysis of trademark infringement and dilution;
5. ignoring allegedly undisputed proof of likelihood of confusion and irreparable harm; and
6. announcing a per se rule of functionality in a manner that violated Rule 52 of the Federal
Rules of Procedure.16
The court held that Louboutin’s trademark had acquired limited secondary meaning with
regards to the outsole of the shoe which serves as a distinctive symbol of the designer. The Court
of Appeals concluded that Louboutin’s trademark should be modified and granted protection
only to color contrasting shoes.17 The trademark was thus limited to the outsoles’ color contrast

14

Id., at 449. . (holding that the Court therefore concludes that Louboutin has not established a likelihood that it will
succeed on its claims that YSL infringed the Red Sole Mark to warrant the relief that it seeks.)
15
Christian Louboutin, LLC v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2012).
16
Id., at 215. (See Federal Rule of Procedure 52(a)(2) which requires that “[I]n granting or refusing an interlocutory
injunction, the court must … state [separately] the findings [of fact] and conclusions [of law] that support its
action.”) Louboutin asserts that the District Court failed to make findings of fact as required by that rule, and
announced a new per se legal rule rather than merely entering conclusions of law.
17
Id., at 212.
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with the shoes upper components, as that design feature had acquired secondary meaning.18
Therefore, YSL’s monochromatic red shoe did not constitute infringement on the Louboutin
trademark.
While the court may have been correct in concluding that there was no likely point-of-sale
confusion, there is likely post- sale confusion. Point-of-sale confusion is unlikely since the
clientele that typically would purchase high end designer shoes would be aware of what designer
they are purchasing, especially when hundreds and even thousands of dollars are spent in
acquisition of the designer good. But, by holding that YSL was allowed to continue to sell its
shoes, the court opened the door for post-sale confusion as an ordinary person would not be able
to tell the difference between the shoes and may confuse a shoe designed by the YSL fashion
house for a Louboutin shoe. This has potential harms as the confusion could lead to harm to the
designers reputation as an individual may think a shoe that was crafted poorly was designed by
Louboutin and thus refrain from purchasing a pair of Louboutin’s.
PART III: Basic Trademark Law and the History of Color
Trademark law was designed to “secure the public’s interest in protection against deceit as to
the sources of its purchases and the businessman’s right to enjoy business earned through
investment in the good will and reputation attached to a trade name”.19 Under the Lanham Act,
trademark registration is granted to “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof… which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register…,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods… from those manufactured and sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods.”20 Granting protection to a source identifying mark helps not
only the consumer but the producer as well. The consumer knows that this item was produced by
18

See generally “Louboutin II”.
Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1995).
20
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
19
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the same producer with other similar marks. Meanwhile, the producer is allowed to reap the
financial benefits of producing the good, as well as the benefits that bolster its reputation as the
producer of a desirable product.21 It is important to note that trademark law does not serve to
grant a monopoly to the creator of the innovation, as that is more suited for copyright and patent
law where innovation is encouraged.22
Claims for trademark infringement require a two step analysis. First, for infringement to
occur, the mark must actually be protected. To be a protectable mark, the mark must be
inherently distinctive and identify a particular source.23 However, trademark protection can be
granted to marks that are not inherently distinctive if the public believes that the mark has
acquired secondary meaning. Secondary meaning is acquired when, “in the minds of the public,
the primary significance of a product feature… is to identify the source of the product rather than
the product itself.” 24 If the mark is deemed to be a valid and protectable trademark, the second
inquiry one must make is whether, if the defendant were to use the similar mark, a likelihood of
confusion would exist.25
The rules governing the protectability of color as a trademark have evolved over time. Earlier
cases have expressed some doubt as to whether or not color could serve as a valid trademark.26
Some courts have held that in some instances, color alone can serve as a trademark if secondary
meaning is acquired.27 In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was

21

Qualitex, at 163-64.
Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America, 269 F.3d 114, 120 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that trademark
law should not be used to “inhibit [ ] legitimate competition by giving monopoly control to a producer over a useful
product”).
23
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,768, 112 S.Ct. 2753 (1992).
24
Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 (1982).
25
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2006).
26
See A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 26 S.Ct. 425, 50 (1906) (“Whether mere
color can constitute a valid trademark may admit of doubt”).
27
See Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147 F.2d 407 (6 th Cir. 1945) (holding that the
user of the mark was “entitled to protection in its long established use of the color yellow on its taxicabs …,
22
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faced with the issue of single color trademark registration in regards to a manufacturer’s pink
fiberglass material. The court held that the use of the mark “serves the classical trademark
function of indicating the origin of the goods, and thereby protects the public.”28 The Court
reasoned that if the mark “is capable of being or becoming distinctive of the applicant’s goods in
commerce, then it is capable of serving as a trademark.”29 Therefore, the Court concluded that
the color pink used in the residential insulation material entitled the manufacturer to receive
trademark protection, permitting the manufacturer to register its mark.30
Trademark protection with color was finally addressed by the Supreme Court in 1995, when
the Supreme Court decided the Qualitex v. Jacobson case. In Qualitex, the Court was faced with
granting trademark protection for the green-gold color of a dry cleaning press pad. The issue
before the Court was “whether the Lanham Act permits the registration of a trademark that
consists, purely and simply, of a color.”31 The Supreme Court reasoned that “it is difficult to
find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason to disqualify absolutely the use of color as a
mark.”32 Additionally, the Court went further and held that “color alone, at least sometimes, can
meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark. It can act as a symbol that distinguishes
a firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any other significant purpose.”33
This analysis of trademark law and protection granted to color illustrates that the use of color
as a trademark can be valid as the red soled shoe is a symbol of the Louboutin brand and
identifies that this particular shoe was designed by Louboutin. This identification is achieved
simply with the use of the color red, without the fashion house having to put a designer logo on
inasmuch as it has acquired a good will by use of the yellow color scheme on taxicabs by virtue of appropriate
application of the doctrine of secondary meaning”).
28
See Owens- Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123.
29
Id., at 1120.
30
Id., at 1128.
31
Qualitex, at 160-61.
32
Id., at 164.
33
Id., at 166.
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the shoes. Although, it should be noted that the color can be valid, but more is needed, such as
evidence of the existence of secondary meaning. The certificate of registration of the Red Sole
Mark gives rise to the presumption that Louboutin’s mark is valid, although this presumption
may be rebutted.34
PART IV: POINT OF SALE CONFUSION IN REGARDS TO LOUBOUTIN
Point of sale confusion occurs when a company uses a confusingly similar mark, which
consumers may think is the mark that has a valid and protectable trademark. This infringement,
as a result, causes the consumer to be confused as they believe that the defendant’s good came
from the valid trademark owner. As a result, a diversion is created which increases sales for the
alleged infringer while resulting in a loss of sales for the trademark owner as well as a loss of
control over the trademarks owners’ reputation.35 Point of sale confusion is not likely to be
present with a good of this caliber. Given the high cost of a pair of Louboutin shoes, with some
pairs over one thousand dollars, most buyers are sophisticated purchasers who pay attention to
detail and have a greater degree of care when purchasing such an expensive luxury good. Here,
the Second Circuit was correct in determining that point of sale confusion is not a relevant issue
to the trademark in question. But, the court concluded its analysis here and did not continue on to
determine whether or not post-sale confusion was present.
PART V: POST-SALE CONFUSION IN REGARDS TO LOUBOUTIN

34

See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that a certificate of registration with the PTO is prima facie evidence that the mark is registered and valid
(i.e., protectable), that the registrant owns the mark, and that the registrant has the exclusive right to use the mark in
commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).) (stating that registration by the PTO without proof of secondary meaning
creates the presumption that the mark is more than merely descriptive, and, thus, that the mark is inherently
distinctive. PaperCutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 563 (2d Cir.1990). As a result, when a plaintiff sues
for infringement of its registered mark, the defendant bears the burden to rebut the presumption of mark's
protectibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.)
35
See generally Hearts on Fire v. Blue Nile, 603 F.Supp.2d 274 (D. Mass. 2009).
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Post-sale confusion confuses the general public, not the consumer, with the use of a similar
mark. Post-sale confusion occurs when a “potential purchaser, knowing that the public is likely
to be confused or deceived by the allegedly infringing product, will choose to purchase that
product instead of a genuine one.”36 Post-sale confusion arises from a good that is intended to
confuse non-purchasers, rather than a misdirected purchase as with point-of-sale confusion.37
The harm that is caused by post-sale confusion most notably is a potential loss of reputation,
most especially if the infringing goods are of an inferior quality when compared to the goods
produced by the valid trademark owner.38 Other harms with post-sale confusion include: harm to
the originals reputation for rarity, a decrease in the original goods value, harm to consumers if
the original good decreases the value in the product to compete more economically, harm to the
trademark owner if sales decline due to fear of the public that they may not be purchasing an
original good, and deception to the general public if expertise is required to distinguish between
the two goods.39
A) DETERMINING POST-SALE CONFUSION
The Second Circuit has held that confusion does not need to be limited to point-of-sale
confusion to be actionable under the Lanham Act. Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that
confusion “among non-purchasers, arising from use of a mark outside of a retail environment
after any sale of purchase of a product has concluded, is actionable under the Lanham Act.”40

36

See Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., 868 F. Supp.2d 207 (2012) at 238, 239.
Id.
38
See generally GM v. Keystone
39
Id.
40
See Clinique Laboratories, Inc., 945 F.Supp. at 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that use of disclaimers is
insufficient to address post-sale confusion among consumers).
37
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In determining post-sale confusion, Courts in the Second Circuit apply the eight factors set
forth by the Second Circuit in the Polaroid case.41 These factors include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

the strength of plaintiff’s mark,
similarity of plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks,
competitive proximity of the products,
bridging the gap,
actual confusion,
defendant’s intent/bad faith,
quality of defendant’s product, and
sophistication of consumers.42

This list of factors is not exhaustive and no one factor is dispositive, rather this list serves as
a guide in determining confusion.43 The Second Circuit has held that “the steady application of
Polaroid is critical to the proper development of trademark law, for it is only when the Polaroid
factors are applied consistently and clearly over time that the relevant distinctions between
different factual configurations can emerge.”44 Additionally, the Second Circuit has held that
“no single Polaroid factor is pre-eminent, nor can the presence or absence of one without
analysis of the others, determine the outcome of an infringement suit.”45
Post-sale confusion can be harmful as there may be confusion over whether or not the item
may be an original and expertise may be required to distinguish between an original and an
infringer.46 In the case of Louboutin, one could assume that YSL would also be creating a high
end product so the shoes most likely would be of similar quality. This assumption is based on
41

See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that Plaintiff's 11–year delay,
with knowledge of allegedly infringing use, in proceeding against defendant for trademark infringement, barred
plaintiff from relief so long as defendant's use of allegedly infringing mark remained far removed from plaintiff's
primary fields of activity.)
42
See generally id..
43
See generally id.. Also see Lois Sportwear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986)
(“The Polaroid factors serve as a useful guide through a difficult quagmire. Each case, however, presents its own
peculiar circumstances.”).
44
See New Kayak Pool Corp. v. R & P Pools, Inc., 246 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2001) (remanding for consideration of the
Polaroid factors).
45
See Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 1985).
46
See generally, Hermes International v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, at 108 (2d. Cir. 2000).
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several factors such as the high cost of the good as well as the notoriety that Louboutin has
gained as being a high end luxury designer. Additionally, the concern over the relative quality is
not as great in cases of post-sale confusion as “such persons are not in a position to examine a
product’s construction and materials.” The focus on post-sale confusion is the view of the casual
observers in the general public rather than the confusion among direct purchasers, which is the
concern in point-of-sale confusion.47 But, this even further illustrates the point that allowing YSL
to produce monochromatic red shoes is likely result in post-sale confusion by the general public.
As the record in the District Court stated, the red sole shoe can “instantly” be attributed to
Louboutin.48 Louboutin is an innovator in the fashion industry as he transformed the soles of
shoes that typically are black or beige and transformed them into a red sole that has gained
worldwide recognition.49 Imagine this scene as described by the District Court: “… Hollywood
starlets cross red carpets and high fashion models strut down runways, and heads turn and eyes
drop to the celebrities’ feet, lacquered red outsoles… that flaunt a glamorous statement that pops
out at once.” 50 The instant recognition that Louboutin has gained makes it all the more likely
that post-sale confusion will occur as the general public could easily think YSL’s red soled shoe
was really designed by Louboutin. With a post-sale confusion claim, the plaintiff “…must
establish a likelihood of confusion among an appreciable number of post-sale observers.”51
Furthermore, this confusion must occur in the commercial context by casual observers.52
Louboutin’s mark most certainly falls within the commercial context and the confusion here

47

See generally Gucci America, citing Lanham Act, §§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C.A. §§1114, 1115
See “Louboutin I”, at 448.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See generally Gucci America, citing Lanham Act 32, 43, 15 U.S.C.A. 1114, 1125.
52
See generally Gucci America.
48
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would most likely occur by casual observers since the purchasers would not experience any
confusion as they are considered to be a sophisticated buyer of luxury goods.
In determining the existence of trademark infringement with post-sale confusion, the marks
are considered similar if they create the same commercial impression in the contexts that would
be encountered by the casual observer.53 Here, the red soled shoes by Louboutin and YSL do
create a similar commercial impression. To the ordinary person walking down the street, or the
models and celebrities who wear a pair of red soled shoes on the red carpet or in a magazine,
how would be a casual observer be able to distinguish between the two designers? The only
plausible way to know if a red soled shoe was Louboutin or YSL would be if the name of the
fashion house that designed the shoe was explicitly stated. But, most casual observers may not
even inquire as to the origin of the designer as those observers in the know in the fashion
industry may automatically associate the red sole with Christian Louboutin.
B) APPLYING THE POLAROID FACTORS
1) STRENGTH OF THE PLAINTIFF’S MARK
In determining the strength of the mark, the Second Circuit focuses on the distinctiveness
of the mark.54 The test for the mark’s strength is 1) the degree to which it is inherently
distinctive; and 2) the degree to which it is distinctive in the marketplace.55 The first element of
this test does not apply to this case as the Supreme Court has held that color cannot be inherently
distinctive.56 The distinctiveness in the marketplace can be evaluated by looking at the evidence
of sales, marketing and advertising, continuous use of the mark by Louboutin, website traffic,

53

Id.
See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing that the precise focus of
distinctiveness is its tendency to identify goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, although
possibly anonymous source).
55
Id.
56
See generally Qualitex.
54
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and use in the media are just a few examples of evidence that can be gathered to determine
distinctiveness.57 This is known as commercial or acquired distinctiveness as it has developed
with both purchasers and non-purchasers to identify the red sole as a design by Louboutin and
therefore shows that Louboutin’s use of the color red as acquired secondary meaning.58
As of 2012, Louboutin was selling 600,000 pairs of shoes annually and had forty-two
Louboutin boutiques worldwide. His designs can also be purchased on his website, in 2010 his ecommerce website became active in the United States and in 2012 his European e-commerce
website was launched.59 Louboutin has countless celebrity fans display his shoes in all forms of
media from the red carpet to magazines. Some of these celebrities include: Madonna, Blake
Lively, Sarah Jessica Parker, Jennifer Lopez, Kim Kardashian, Beyonce, Victoria Beckham, and
Katie Holmes and her young daughter, just to name a few of the many famous faces who wear
the infamous red sole. Jennifer Lopez even created a song titled “Louboutin” where she states in
the verse, “I’m throwing on my Louboutin’s”. Together these factors help to provide further
evidence to illustrate the distinctiveness of Louboutin’s mark and its strength. Therefore, postsale confusion is likely as YSL’s red monochromatic shoes are likely to confuse individuals
other than the buyer due to the strength and overall fame of Louboutin’s mark.
2) DEGREE OF SIMILARITY
The degree of similarity includes an analysis of: 1) “whether the similarity between the
two marks is likely to cause post-sale confusion and 2) what effect the similarity has upon
prospective purchasers.”60
57

See Lois Sportswear, at 741. (in discussing the distinctiveness in the marketplace, the court looked at evidence of
widespread advertising and promotion of defendant’s product that featured defendant’s mark, continuous use of the
mark for more than a century, and sales figures to determine the strength of the mark).
58
See generally, id..
59
See Voguepedia: Christian Louboutin http://www.vogue.com/voguepedia/Christian_Louboutin (last accessed
November 5, 2013).
60
See Sports Authority Inc., v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 962 (2d Cir. 1996).
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The question to be asked here is whether, when worn, if the shoes designed by YSL are
likely to confuse people other than the buyer due to the degree of similarity. The court should
focus on the fact that YSL has created a monochromatic red shoe and determine whether or not
the difference between the YSL and Louboutin shoe is such that non-purchasers will not be
confused. The relevant similarity in this case is not just the red soles of the shoes but also the red
upper body of the shoes. The use of the monochromatic shoe by YSL is likely to cause confusion
when compared to Louboutin’s monochromatic red sole.
Accordingly, the court could find that the similarity between the use of the red soles by
the two fashion houses is extremely similar and therefore is likely to cause confusion in the postsale context.
3) PROXIMITY OF THE PRODUCTS
The proximity of the products can result in confusion over the source of the origin of the
product. To prevail on this factor, the Plaintiff (Louboutin) must show that the parties’ products
are sufficiently related in the context in which they are found.61 The focus of this test is
“…whether and to what extent the two products compete with each other.”62 To prevail under
this factor, Louboutin must show that “the parties’ products or services are sufficiently related so
that customers are likely to confuse the source of the origin.”63 The shoes that are sold together
in department stores such as Saks Fifth Avenue or Neiman Marcus are more likely to be related
and cause confusion as they would be sold in the same area of the store. But, this does not apply
here as the confusion at issue is in regards to post-sale confusion, which does not include
consumers who are contemplating purchasing the product. This point is not really relevant to the
discussion of a likelihood of post-sale confusion. The element of where the shoes are sold is not
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relevant here as it only applies to purchasers and therefore would be more applicable in
determining point-of-sale confusion.
The inquiry that needs to be made here is whether or not the goods at issue are the same
type of goods. In an extreme example, it would be highly impossible for a non-purchaser to think
that a red soled tire for a luxury vehicle was made by shoe designer Louboutin as these are two
entirely different products. But, two red soled shoes, created by two high end fashion designers,
are very similar products. The fact that they are both shoes increases the likelihood that nonpurchasers will be confused. Therefore, the similarity of the marks is relevant in establishing a
likelihood of confusion in this case.
This factor also can be considered along with the final Polaroid factor of sophistication
of the consumers. These two factors are frequently considered together in the Second Circuit
because the likelihood of confusion here also can vary based on the sophistication of the relevant
purchasing parties.64 But, here, the focus of the issue between Louboutin and YSL focuses on the
post-sale confusion not point-of-sale confusion so the sophistication by consumers is not relevant
among purchasers when analyzing confusion in a post-sale context.
4) LIKELIHOOD OF BRIDGING THE GAP
One of the prominent Polaroid factors that not present in this case is bridging the gap. This
element of confusion poses the question: “whether the two companies are likely to compete
directly in the same market.”65 The shoes by YSL and Louboutin are both shoes that are
designed by high end fashion houses. Therefore, it can be determined that they would be in the
same market, more so than a pair of knock-off shoes which would appeal to a different
consumer. Under the Lanham Act, “when the companies target the same customers, there is no
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gap to bridge, and this factor leans in favor of the plaintiff.”66 Here, both YSL and Christian
Louboutin are already in the same market as they are already well established fashion houses.
Both designers are already sold in department stores such as Neiman Marcus and Saks Fifth
Avenue and both have their own stores worldwide. Since Louboutin and YSL both have been in
the same market prior to the alleged infringement that is the subject of this litigation, there is no
gap to bridge. Courts have held that where the market for competing goods or services is the
same, there is no need to determine whether or not bridging the gap will occur between the two
markets.67 Therefore, bridging the gap is not a relevant factor in determining whether a
likelihood of confusion exists in this case. The lack of bridging the gap in this case does not
harm the analysis of likelihood of confusion in the post-sale context as courts have held that
irrelevant factors can be abandoned in the analysis.68
5) EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION OF CONSUMERS
Actual confusion is defined as the likelihood of consumer confusion that enables a seller
to pass off his goods as the goods of another.69 But, it has been determined that actual confusion
does not need to be shown to prevail in an infringement claim under the Lanham Act. In reality,
actual confusion is very difficult to prove and the Lanham Act “requires only a likelihood of
confusion as to the source.”70 Proof of actual confusion can be proven by evidence conducted
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through a survey, although such evidence is not required.71 A survey can be considered to be
highly probative evidence of the existence of a likelihood of confusion. Additionally, if a survey
is conducted it must be “fairly prepared and its results directed to the relevant issues.”72
In the matter at hand, no surveys were conducted by either party to the litigation.
Conducting a survey would be useful here as it would serve as proof of actual confusion among
post-sale consumers. However, conducting a truly fair and scientific survey could be costly. If a
survey were to be conducted, the ideal test group would be among relevant post-sale viewers of
the shoes designed by YSL. But, as previously stated, actual confusion does not need to be
proven to constitute a likelihood of confusion. Therefore, this Polaroid factor can be set aside as
it is not crucial to establishing post-sale confusion in regards to the red soled shoe.
6) THE DEFENDANT’S GOOD FAITH IN ADOPTING THE MARK
To analyze this factor of the Polaroid test, one must ask whether the defendant used the
plaintiff’s mark with the “intention of capitalizing on plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill and any
confusion between his and the senior user’s product.”73 Here, given the notoriety of Louboutin’s
red sole shoes, YSL was aware that their use of the monochromatic red shoe as part of the YSL
Cruise Collection could result in confusion between the two designers. At the time YSL designed
and marketed their shoe, Louboutin’s trademark included all red soles. Therefore at the time of
YSL’s creation they engaged in bad faith. Although Louboutin’s trademark was modified to
include only color contrasting red soled shoes, the initial creation of YSL’s products clearly
exemplifies bad faith. Cases in the Second Circuit have held that “actual or constructive
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knowledge may signal bad faith.”74 Furthermore, decisions in this circuit have held that the
second comer, here YSL, has “a duty to so name and dress his product” in such a way as to avoid
all likelihood of confusion, when compared to the first comer, Louboutin.75 YSL could have
avoided this issue entirely if they acted in good faith when creating their 2011 Cruise Collection.
There clearly is a lack of good faith on behalf of YSL and therefore, this factor weighs in
favor of Louboutin.
7) THE QUALITY OF THE DEFENDANT’S GOOD
The quality of the good used by the defendant plays an important role in determining if a
likelihood of confusion exists. The quality of the good is relevant for two reasons. First, an
inferior good may cause injury to the plaintiff if people think that the goods come from the same
source. Second, products of equal quality may create confusion as to the source of the good
because of this similarity.76
While the red soled shoes here are strikingly similar, the harm to Louboutin’s reputation
would not be as severe as YSL and Louboutin are both high end designers that create luxury
goods using high end materials. This factor would be different if the defendant’s red sole shoes
were created using inferior materials as then it would be more likely to cause harm to the
reputation of Louboutin. The lack of YSL’s shoes being inferior to Louboutin’s in the post-sale
context makes this factor inapplicable. The second prong of the test for quality of the defendant’s
goods is more relevant to this case as the products are of such a similar quality that confusion can
occur as to the source of the designer of the shoe. Therefore, this similarity in quality could lead
to the existence of post-sale confusion.
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8) SOPHISTICATION OF CONSUMERS
In regards to purchasing luxury designer shoes, it can be said that the consumers would be
sophisticated. In analyzing this factor, one looks at the level of care and attention that is paid by
consumers. When an individual is paying anywhere from six hundred to one thousand dollars for
a pair of shoes, it can be concluded that they would place a higher degree of time and effort in
purchasing the luxury good. But again, this factor is more relevant towards point-of-sale
confusion than post-sale confusion. Post-sale confusion focuses more on the general nonpurchasing public rather than the purchaser. Therefore, the sophistication of consumers may not
be a relevant factor in terms of post-sale confusion.
While the sophistication of purchasers is an irrelevant factor, the sophistication of the
non-purchasers is a relevant factor in this case. The shoes designed by YSL and Louboutin are so
similar that sophisticated consumers would have a hard time determining which designer
produced a particular monochromatic red shoe. It could even be assumed that non-purchasers
would believe that the shoe was designed by Louboutin based on the notoriety of Louboutin
alone. If a comparison between the shoes were to be made by non-purchasers after the lawsuit
between Louboutin and YSL became known then maybe some people would question who
designed the all red shoes. But, overall, it can be argued that even sophisticated non-consumers
would have a difficult time in determining which luxury designer created the high end red
monochromatic shoe. As a result, the sophistication of non-purchasers is a relevant factor in
determining post-sale confusion in this case.
C) OVERALL POLAROID FACTOR ANALYSIS
Therefore, the overall analysis of the Polaroid factors in regards to determining post-sale
confusion with the red sole shoes shows that there is a likelihood of confusion. The most
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important factors used to reach this confusion in the case at bar are: the strength of Louboutin’s
mark, the degree of similarity between Louboutin and YSL, the proximity of the products, YSL’s
lack of good faith in adopting the mark, and the quality of the shoes produced by YSL.
D) ARGUMENTS AGAINST POST-SALE CONFUSION
While the defense for YSL, on a post-sale confusion claim, would argue that the creation of a
trademark is not to decrease competition and have a monopoly on a mark as that is more in the
realm of copyright law, it should not allow for the misuse of a mark that clearly has acquired
secondary meaning. Unlike copyright law, trademark law aims to prevent consumer confusion
even if it hinders the creation of a mark. In trademark law, “if a branding specialist produces a
mark that is identical to one already trademarked by another individual or corporation, he must
‘go back to the drawing board’.” 77
On the alternative side, those against the doctrine of post-sale confusion will argue that the
fashion houses both create goods that are of a high quality so the prestige or low quality will not
be a major element that would cause harm to the designer. But, Louboutin’s shoe itself,
regardless of color is distinct. Louboutin’s “lasts are shorter (from toe to heel), higher (in the
arch), and tighter (across the width of the foot) than most designers.”78 It has been said that
Louboutin has “upped the ante in terms of how high the heel can soar.” Additionally, his shoes
have been described to “morph the body” as they lengthen the legs, define the calves, and lift
one’s rear, all features that most women seek plastic surgery to achieve.79 Certainly, no casual
observers on the street would be able to tell the difference between these proportions of a shoe,
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which therefore would result in post-sale confusion. This argument fails, just as the argument
that people would not even notice the use of the red soles as the casual observer would not pay
attention to the sole of a shoe. There has been evidence as stated in the District Court and the
Court of Appeals that the red sole makes the shoe “pop” and stand out. By decorating the outsole
of the shoe, the shoe becomes an “object of beauty.”80 The facts of the case even stated that
Louboutin has created a product “so eccentric and striking that it is easily perceived and
remembered.”81 This rebuts any presumption that casual observers would not notice the red sole
mark and therefore post-sale confusion is likely to exist with regards to the use of the red sole
mark by YSL on monochromatic shoes.
Many of the other arguments against post-sale confusion also fail. One such argument is that
post-sale confusion does not apply if the mark is not highly visible to third persons when the
product is being used.82 But, this argument fails here as the soles of shoes are visible, whereas
underwear, the issue in Munisngwear v. Jockey, is not. Additionally, the argument that post-sale
confusion does not come into play where the businessperson’s interests do not come into play is
not applicable in the Louboutin case.83 The red sole used by Louboutin significantly affects the
cost of the shoe as the addition of the red lacquered finish is more expensive than producing
identical shoes without the finish. This higher cost of production is actually desirable to
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designers like Louboutin as it makes the final creation more exclusive and costly.84 Therefore,
the business interests of Louboutin do come into play as the exclusivivity and cost are major
elements of the Louboutin design.
Another argument against post-sale confusion is that the allegedly confused consumers in the
post-sale confusion context are not purchasers or even potential purchasers of the goods. Since
post-sale confusion focuses on the view of the “casual observer”, those against post-sale
confusion will say that their confusion is irrelevant since they are not purchasing the luxury
brand shoes. But, confusion “need not always be that of a potential purchaser but can exist where
‘the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the
public would identify them as being the plaintiff’s trademarks’.”85 The intent of Congress is to
protect the public at large, not merely purchasers or potential purchasers. Applying this
reasoning, the public would identify the red outer sole of YSL’s shoes as the red sole mark used
by Louboutin as the evidence has already established the fame and recognition that the mark has
obtained. Furthermore, the fact that YSL is another luxury designer is additional evidence that
they are well aware of the mark used by one of their luxury competitors.
PART VI: “POST LOUBOUTIN II” DECISION
The Court’s decision in Louboutin leaves many questions unanswered in regards to post-sale
confusion with color. Yet, both sides in the case claimed a victory. While Louboutin’s trademark
was modified by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the PTO acknowledged that it was a
valid mark once modified.86 Harley Lewin, the attorney for the fashion house stated the decision
84

See Louboutin II at 454.
See generally Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., v. Canner, 645 F. Sup. 484 (United States District Court, S.D. Florida,
Miami Division, 1986). See also Rolls-Royce Motor Ltd., v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689 (N.D.Ga.
1976) (considering a case where the court found in favor of Rolls-Royce Motors in an action against a manufacturer
of automobile customizing kits, claiming that one of the defendant’s kits infringed on its grill and hood
ornamentation designs).
86
See generally, “Louboutin II”.
85

23

allows Louboutin “to protect a life’s work as the same is embodied in the red sole found on his
women’s luxury shoes.”87 Yet, YSL claimed a victory as well as the fashion house is now
allowed to sell women’s shoes that all are red. The attorney who represented YSL stated that the
Second Circuit’s decision was a complete victory for YSL for this very reason.88 While this may
be a victory in this sense for both parties, there still are many legal concerns left unanswered by
the courts decision and post-sale confusion is still likely to occur.
In May 2013, Louboutin filed suit in the Southern District of New York against Alba
Footwear, Easy Pickins, Inc., and Alan H. Warshak, for trademark infringement. The defendants
here manufactured and sold counterfeit versions of Louboutin’s red sole. The allegedly
infringing shoe produced by Alba is named “Christian” and includes a red sole. The shoe is a
leopard print with spikes, but this alone would not have given rise to the infringement claims had
Alba not infringed on the Red Sole Mark. The fashion house is asking for two million dollars in
damages, injunctive relief, as well as additional damages.89
Most recently, another shoemaker has marketed shoes with red soles. In June 2013,
Louboutin brought a claim for trademark infringement against Charles Jourdan, a lower end
designer for selling red soled shoes at the shoe chain Designer Shoe Warehouse (DSW) at
locations in Brooklyn and Manhattan in addition to listing the shoes for sale on their website,
DSW.com. The case was filed in New York federal court but within a month, the parties reached
a settlement agreement.90 Since the details of the settlement are not public, it is unknown exactly
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how much the two designers settled for or any concessions that were made. But, the use of the
red sole by Charles Jourdan would constitute post-sale confusion by the casual observer.
Additionally, there could have been the potential for point-of-sale confusion if the purchaser
truly believed that they were purchasing a pair of Louboutin shoes. Although it is highly unlikely
that a consumer would even find a pair of Louboutin’s for sale at DSW, a discount shoe chain.
Allowing lawsuits such as this is not in the judicial economy of the court, not only in New York
but in the Second Circuit, or any other jurisdictional venue in which a fashion case regarding
confusion, most specifically post-sale confusion would occur. The lack of clarity on this type of
infringement leaves many unanswered questions.
CONCLUSION
The modification of Louboutin’s trademark by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
allows for post-sale confusion as there is likely to be confusion among non-purchasers who see
the monochromatic red shoes. The Second Circuit did not go far enough in its decision and
should have held that Louboutin’s trademark should apply to the monochromatic red shoe and
not just the color contrasting shoes. In the fashion industry, color plays a prominent role as a
means of creativity and design and therefore the court should protect both the monochromatic
red shoes as well as the color contrasting red shoes. The biggest failure of the Second Court was
the lack of analysis regarding a likelihood of confusion in the post-sale context.
The Second Circuit in most infringement cases applies the Polaroid Factors, a list of eight
factors that are non-exhaustive in determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists. It is
troubling that the Second Circuit did not even address this issue or apply the Polaroid test. Had
this test been applied, it can be argued that the Second Circuit would have ruled differently. Most
importantly, the failure the address that there was a lack of good faith on behalf of YSL as well
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as a high degree of similarity between the products, illustrates the failure of this court.
Furthermore, there exists a close proximity between the products as they are competing fashion
houses who produce the same type goods which are sold together in major luxury department
stores worldwide. Most importantly, the strength of Louboutin’s famous mark should have been
discussed by the Second Circuit as this clearly would result in a likelihood of post-sale
confusion.
The lack of bridging the gap does not deter the finding that a likelihood of confusion exists.
In fact, the products designed by both fashion houses are already competing in the same market.
Therefore, this factor, actually weighs in favor of Louboutin since the designers target the same
consumer base resulting in a lack of a gap to bridge. Additionally, the lack of actual confusion of
consumers is irrelevant in a post-sale confusion analysis as well as the sophistication of
consumers. It is important to keep in mind that this analysis is geared toward the general public
rather than the consumer who is currently in the store. These two Polaroid factors would be
more applicable to a point-of-sale confusion analysis rather than an analysis regarding post-sale
confusion.
While Louboutin’s attorney stated that this case was a victory for the fashion house, as the
court held that the designer’s color contrasting shoes were entitled to valid trademark protection,
this has not stopped Louboutin from filing trademark infringement suits against other designers.
Although none of the infringement claims since the YSL suit have been high end fashion houses
like YSL, there nonetheless has been infringement by other manufactures. This poses the
question of when will these creators realize that the Red Sole Mark belongs to Louboutin.
Although post-sale confusion will still exist with cheaper products embodying the red sole mark,
the failure of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to even address the issue of post-sale
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confusion calls the need for a case either in the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court to address
this issue.
Overall, it can be determined that the Second Circuit’s failure to address post-sale confusion
in the case of Christian Louboutin v. YSL is the biggest flaw of the court’s ruling that
Louboutin’s trademark can only be valid on color contrasting shoes. The lack of analysis by the
Court is troubling, as in most cases for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act most
courts apply an analysis assessing whether or not a likelihood of confusion exists. Different
courts use different factors in determining confusion. For instance, the Federal Circuit applies the
DuPont factors, whereas the Fourth Circuit applies the Pizzeria Uno factors. But regardless of
the name of the test, the lack of an application by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
regarding a likelihood of post-sale confusion had resulted in a decision that future courts will
need to reevaluate and possibly overturn. Therefore, the application of the Polaroid factors in
this case would allow for a likelihood of post-sale confusion to exist and could have resulted in
Louboutin’s original trademark to be upheld rather than the modification that was issued by the
Second Circuit.
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